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The paper examines the effects of demographic change on federal, state and local governments in Germany with a 
focus on the expenditure side to answer the question, whether demographic change will induce vertical fiscal 
expenditure imbalances. We present estimates of the impact of demographic change on public spending based on a 
decomposition of expenditures into almost 30 categories (functions). Our results suggest that demographic change will 
indeed result in significant vertical expenditure imbalances between the federal and the subnational government sector 
as well as within the subnational government sector. In addition, the estimates show that the structure of expenditures 
by function has to be adjusted considerably in order to avoid deficits as demographically induced increases in 
expenditures in some important functions, such as pension payments, have to be counterbalanced by exploiting 
potential savings that arise from demographic change in other functions. 
 
 
JEL-Classification: J1, H1, H7 
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acknowledge support by the Germany Research Foundation (DFG) within the research project (DFG-
Schwerpunktprogramm) "Governance of federal systems: theoretical approaches and empirical evidence 
(“Institutionelle Gestaltung föderaler Systeme: Theorie und Empirie”).  2
1. Introduction 
 
As most other industrialized countries, Germany faces rather dramatic demographic 
challenges in the next decades: An ageing society, a low reproduction rate, a declining 
population and workforce as well as a significant redistribution of population within and 
across regions. These demographic changes will have considerable effects on the economy 
and public budgets. The present paper is devoted to an examination of the fiscal consequences 
of demographic changes in federal systems, a subject that has been rarely touched in the 
literature. Notable exceptions are some studies for Canada, see for example Lazar, St-Hilaire 
and Tremblay (2003), Ruggeri (2001), Conference Board of Canada (2002) as well as for the 
US (see Lee and Edwards 2001) and the theoretical work of Echevarría (1995). Most studies 
that examine the interrelation between demographics and public finance take a look at the 
budget of the central government or the total government sector and concentrate on the 
financing of (publicly funded) social security systems.
1 In federal systems, repercussions of 
demographics on public expenditures and revenues can divert significantly across the 
different levels of governments and therefore a disaggregate analysis by level of government 
is important. Such an investigation will be presented in this study taking the Federal Republic 
of Germany as an example.  
 
The focus of the paper is on the expenditure side of government budgets. Given that in 
Germany the bulk of tax revenues come out of joint taxes and a highly equalizing 
interjurisdictional transfer system contributes to a significant convergence of per capita 
revenues across the regions, demographic change will have only marginal effects on the 
distribution of tax revenues across the different levels of government in Germany. Therefore, 
the revenue side is not taken into account. In addition, contrary to many other studies the 
social security system is not included in our definition of the public sector, i.e., the public 
sector is confined to the federal, state and local government level. Only direct transfers out of 
public sector budgets - such as the tremendous subsidies of the federal government to the 
pension system - are taken into account. In section 2 we start with a brief discussion of the 
most important demographic facts in Germany. Section 3 sketches the fiscal federalism 
system in Germany. Methodical issues are discussed in section 4 with a focus on the 
derivation and forecast of age expenditure profiles which are the central element of our 
estimation procedure. In section 5 we construct simple age cost profiles by government 
functions and develop estimates of the impact of demographic change on expenditures at the 
three levels of government. These estimates are used to examine the question whether vertical 
fiscal expenditure imbalances will arise in Germany as a consequence of demographic 
change. A final section summarizes our results and outlines prospects for further research. 
 
 
2. Demography in Germany 
 
Figure 1 presents population forecasts for Germany up to 2030. There are marked differences 
between East and West Germany which are due to two main reasons: After the fall of the iron 
curtain in 1989 the birth rate in East Germany dropped to a dramatically low rate of about 
0.75 children per woman in the early nineties and recovered only slowly in the following 
years but did not yet reach the West Germany average rate of about 1.4 children per woman. 
In addition, due to the poor economic performance of the East German economy there are 
rather strong east-west migration-flows. Hence, the East German population declined by 
about 7.5% in the period 1991 - 2003 whereas the population size in West Germany increased 
                                                 
1 See for example Börsch-Supan (1999), Dang et al. (2001) or Leibfritz et al. (1995).   3
by about 5.9%. In the next decades, a further dramatic loss of population is expected in East 
Germany, whereas for West Germany a slight increase is forecasted up to the year 2025, 
thereafter a decline in West Germany is expected, too. 
 
Figure 1: Population size in Germany 2002 - 2030: Normalized series: 2002 = 100 
 
Source: Calculated from data supplied by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. 
 
The main reasons for the demographic developments in Germany are the low total fertility 
rate, defined as the average number of children per women, and the increase in life 
expectancy. The total fertility rate declined from about 2.3 in the 60ties to about 1.45 at the 
turn of the century. In the EU, only Spain, Greece and Italy have lower fertility rates. On the 
other hand, life expectancy (of new-borns) in Germany is forecasted to increase from 
74.8/80.8 (male/female) in 2000 to about 80/85 (male/female) in 2030.
2 As a result, the 
average age of the German population increases strongly, from about 42 years in 2002 to 
about 47 years in 2030, and there are marked shifts between age groups.  
 
Figure 2: Population aged 6 - 28 in East and West Germany as a share of total population 
 
Source: Calculated from data supplied by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. 
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The share of the age cohort 6-28 which demands the services of the education system (schools 
and universities) will decrease from about 26% in 2002 to about 18% in East Germany and to 
about 24% in West Germany in 2020, see figure 2. However, in the years after 2020 there 
will be an east-west convergence process and the share of this age group will approach a level 
of about 21% in both parts of the country. The share of the elderly (65+) is currently about 
17% in East and West Germany and will increase considerably. In 2030 about 33% of the 
East German and about 27% of the West German population will at least be 65 years old, see 
figure 3. The most dramatic changes will be observed for the very old (80+), the share of 
which will increase from about 3.9% in 2002 to 7.3% in 2030 and to about 12.1% in 2050.  
 
Figure 3: Share of the elderly (65+) in East and West Germany as a share of total population 
 
Source: Calculated from data supplied by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. 
 
Figure 4: Work force (15 - 65) in East and West Germany in % of the total population 
 
Source: Calculated from data supplied by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. 
 
There are also marked differences between East and West Germany with respect to the 
working age cohort, 15-65. Currently, in East Germany this age group accounts for about 70% 












































East Germany West Germany  5
the year 2030 this share will decline to about 56% in East Germany and to about 61% in West 
Germany, see figure 4.
3  
 
To summarize, Germany will live to see rather significant demographic changes: a strong 
ageing process, marked shifts of the age structure, a decline in the population size and a quite 
dramatic regional redistribution of population. Never in peace time an industrialized country 
experienced such fast and dramatic demographic changes as can be observed in East 
Germany. However, in some former socialist countries similar demographic earthquakes are 
observed. It should not be hard to imagine, that these changes will have marked effects on 
public budgets. We will examine these effects after discussing the fundamentals of the 
German fiscal federalism system. 
  
 
3. The basic facts on fiscal federalism in Germany 
 
For our subsequent investigation, some knowledge about fiscal federalism in Germany is 
necessary. The Federal Republic of Germany consists of three levels of government: federal 
(Bund), state (Laender) and local level (Gemeindeebene). The German constitution 
(Grundgesetz) defines the responsibilities of the different levels of government. Local 
governments are responsible in particular for local utilities and services such as water supply, 
sewage and waste disposal, the construction and maintenance of local roads, etc. With respect 
to education the local government sector is completely responsible for pre-primary education 
(kindergarten) and the construction as well as maintenance of school infrastructures (school 
buildings). In addition, local governments provide supplementary welfare benefits, especially 
social assistance benefits. These expenditures increased considerably in the past 25 years. 
However, in 2005 a labour market reform was implemented ("Hartz IV reform") which will 
contribute to a reduction of local social assistance expenditures because an increasing share of 
the burden will be shifted to the federal government level. The constitution guarantees 
communities the right to manage their own affairs independently. However, in practice this 
independence is quite restricted because the local governments rely heavily on grant financing 
from state governments and a considerable share of expenditures is mandatory and regulated 
by standards. The states are responsible for cultural affairs, school education (teachers), 
university education, the administration of justice as well as police. The federal government is 
responsible for foreign affairs, defence and supplementary benefits to unemployed persons. 
Moreover, the federal government provides considerable amounts of conditional as well as 
unconditional grants and transfers to the state level.  
 
The main characteristics of the fiscal federalism structure in Germany can shortly be 
summarized as follows: 
•  There is a predominance of joint taxes. In 2003 about 68% of all tax revenues 
belonged to this type of taxes. Roughly 20% of tax revenues accrued to the federal 
government only, approximately 4% to state government and about 8% to the local 
government sector.  
•  Subnational governments have a rather low power to set taxes. State governments are 
even more restricted than local governments. However, the federal government has to 
pass a law if tax laws of joint taxes or taxes that are earmarked to the states are 
changed, and by voting in the Upper Chamber (Bundesrat) the states participate in the 
legislation process. Thus, the states can jointly influence tax policy but none of the 
                                                 
3 As a matter of course, the share of the labor force, depend on the working or retirement age. One should expect 
that in the next decades the retirement age will increase significantly.    6
states can fix tax rates individually. In addition, the states and the federal government 
negotiate the distribution of tax revenues out of shared taxes - especially the value 
added tax - between levels of government.  
•  At the state level, there is a pronounced fiscal equalization system in which financially 
strong states make equalization payments to financially weak states and the federal 
government provides additional complementary federal grants (Bundesergänzungs-
zuweisungen) to financially weak states. The strong equalization system brings about 
a rather weak correlation between state economic performance and per capita state 
revenues. 
•  Intergovernmental transfers are of considerable importance both between the federal 
and state government sector as well as between state governments and the local 
government sector.  
•  Finally, co-financing of tasks is quite common in Germany and consequently there is 
no clear division of (political and financial) responsibilities between the different 
layers of government.  
 
Table 1 presents data on intergovernmental transfers in Germany in 2002. Contrary to our 
definition of the government sector - federal, state and local government sector - we also 
include the social security system in the table because of its significant dependence on federal 
transfers. At the state level, about 16% of all expenditures are financed by other levels of 
governments, the federal government being the most important donor. In East Germany this 
share is close to 40% and in West Germany about 12%. Local governments cover about 34% 
of their expenditures out of grants (from state governments) and here we also observe marked 
differences between East (almost 60%) and West (about 28%) Germany. About 17% of 
expenditures of the social security system are transfers out of the federal budget. Table 1 also 
reports the share of expenditures at the various levels of government that are spent as transfers 
to other levels of government. The federal government’s share is almost 50%, the bulk of 
which are transfers to the social security system (about 55%) and to the state governments 
(about 30%). In West Germany about 20% of state expenditures are intergovernmental 
transfers, in East Germany this share amounts to approximately 35%. Most of these transfers 
are targeted towards the local government sector. In part B of the table we show the most 
important sources of revenues: Taxes and social security contributions (B.1) and transfers 
from other levels of governments (B.2). At the federal government level, almost 90% of all 
revenues come out of taxes. At the state level, this ratio is about 76% in West Germany and 
less than 50% in East Germany. Local governments in West Germany collect about 38% of 
their revenues out of taxes, whereas in East Germany this share is well below 20%. Thus, the 
figures in table 1 reveal the close fiscal interrelations between the different layers of 
governments at both the revenue and expenditure side of the budget. It is not difficult to 
imagine that these strong interdependencies make the political system in Germany rather 
sensitive to log-rolling and pork-barrel policies and creates inefficiencies and inflexibilities.  
 
With respect to the impact of demographic change on revenues at the different levels of 
government, the properties of the fiscal federalism system in Germany have rather important 
implications: 
•  On the revenue side the predominance of shared taxes and the strong fiscal 
equalization system result in a "smoothing effect", i.e. differences in tax revenue 
capacity induced by demographics are smoothed away. 
•  The strong financial interrelations between the different levels of governments on the 
expenditure side also contribute to some "risk sharing" of the effects of demographic 
changes. However, the smoothing effect is considerably lower than on the revenue 
side.    7
Therefore, we refrain from examining the impact of demographic change on revenue 
distribution across the different levels of government because the institutional settings 
strongly suggest that these effects will not be that large, see Bach et al. (2002).   
 
Table 1: Key-Data on intergovernmental fiscal relations in Germany in 2002 
 
 Federal  state  local  social  sec. 
A.1 Share of expenditures financed by transfers from other levels of government 
total 1.3  15.9 33.6  18.1
West Germany    11.5 28.2 
East Germany    37.8 60.1 
A.2 Transfers to other levels of government as a share of total expenditures 
total 15.6
1) (45.6
2) 21.6 4.9  0
West Germany    19.3 5.5 
East Germany    35.3 2.1 
B.1 Share of revenues out of taxes, social security contributions etc. 
total 86.3  71.1 32.5  80.4
West Germany    76.1 36.0 
East Germany    47.1 16.0 
B.2 Share of revenues out of transfers from other levels of government 
total 1.5  17.9 34.5  18.4
West Germany    13.0 29.0 
East Germany    41.9 60.6 
1) Includes transfers to state and local governments only. 
2) Includes transfers to state and local governments as well as the social security system. 
Source: Calculated from data supplied by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. 
 
Next, we take a look at the distribution of expenditures across levels of governments. Because 
of the importance of intergovernmental transfers, the expenditures of the various government 
levels cannot simply be added. Therefore, we use net expenditures (“Nettoausgaben”) 
defined as total expenditures less transfers received from other levels of governments. The 
federal government sector accounts for about 50% of total net government expenditures and 
this share has not changed systematically since 1975. Expenditures of state governments 
amount to about 35% of total expenditures. In the 1990s there has been an upward trend of 
this share whereas the share of local government expenditures slightly decreased. The main 
reason for this decline of local governments’ expenditure share is the strong drop in 
infrastructure spending in recent years. The increase of the spending share at the state level is 
mainly due to the rise in pension payments for retired public servants and interest payments.  
 
In table 2 we report the importance of the different functions for public spending at the 
federal, state and local government sector. At the federal level, the most important spending 
category is welfare (41%). The next important government functions are interest payments 
(13,4%) and defence (9%).
4 Only about 4% of federal expenditures are spent on education. At 
the state level, spending on education has the highest share (about 31%). Public order (police), 
interest payments and pension payments for retired public services as well as social welfare 
account for about 10% of state expenditures respectively.
5 Public administration (esp. state 
ministries) consumes about 6% of total expenditures. All other government functions are of 
                                                 
4 The total sum of transfers of the federal government to lower government levels (state and local governments) 
cannot be calculated from table 2. Some federal transfers are unconditional grants which are included in line 13 
of table 2. Conditional transfers, such as transfers to finance local public transport etc. are assigned as net 
expenditures of the federal government according to the specific government function. 
5 For the same reasons as mentioned above in footnote 7, transfers of state governments to local governments 
cannot be identified in table 2.   8
rather small importance. At the local level, spending on social welfare amounts to 
approximately 30% of expenditures. Most of these expenditures are means-tested social 
assistance benefits. Roughly 20% of local government resources are spent on community 
development and housing as well as education.  
 
Table 2: Net expenditures by category as a share of total net expenditures at the federal, state 
and local government sector in Germany in fiscal year 2002 
 
. Function  Federal  State Local 
1  General public services and administration  4.4% 6.0%  15.2%
2 Defence  8.9% 0.0%  0.0%
3  Public order & safety  0.8% 5.9%  6.3%
4 Jurisdiction  &  prison  0.1% 4.8%  0.0%
5 Schools  0.0% 18.6%  10.1%
6 Kindergarten  0.0% 1.4%  7.1%
7 Universities  0.8% 8.6%  0.0%
8  Financial support to students  0.4% 0.7%  1.3%
9  All other education   0.1% 0.5%  0.5%
10  Research outside universities  2.4% 1.1%  0.2%
11 Culture    0.1% 1.7%  4.4%
12  Health and environmental protection  0.4% 2.6%  7.5%
13  Housing & community amenities  0.6% 2.4%  17.6%
14  Agriculture, forestry & fishing  0.4% 1.8%  0.2%
15  Fuel & energy & water  2.4% 2.9%  1.8%
16  Transportation & communication  3.6% 2.7%  7.1%
17  Other economic affairs and public property 
administration 
8.7% 1.9% 7.9%
18  Pensions for retired public servants  2.2% 9.7%  4.2%
19 Interest  payments  13.4% 9.5%  5.1%
20  Administration of social welfare   0.1% 0.6%  3.1%
21  Transfers to the pension system  26.9% 0.0%  0.0%
22  Other transfers to the social security system  3.4% 0.2%  0.0%
23 Social  assistance  0.2% 4.0%  19.8%
24 Youth  welfare  0.1% 1.1%  6.6%
25  Support for families and mothers  2.1% 1.6%  1.2%
26  Other social welfare   2.0% 0.9%  0.5%
27  Labour market policy and support for the unemployed  6.2% 1.1%  0.0%
28   unconditional transfers to other levels of government 
(transfers received minus transfers payed) 
8.9% 6.1% -29.7%
29 Other  expenditures  0.2% 1.4%  0.7%
 -  Total  100.0% 100.0%  100.0%
Source: Calculated from data provided by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. 
   9
Table 3: Share of net expenditures by function of the federal, state and local government 
sector in Germany in fiscal year 2002 
 
. Function  Federal  State Local 
1  General public services and administration  30.3% 32.2%  37.5%
2 Defence  100.0% 0.0%  0.0%
3  Public order & safety  11.0% 59.8%  29.2%
4 Jurisdiction  &  prison  3.0% 97.0%  0.0%
5 Schools  0.1% 79.9%  20.0%
6 Kindergarten  0.0% 30.8%  69.2%
7 Universities  10.3% 89.7%  0.0%
8  Financial support to students  30.4% 38.6%  31.0%
9  All other education   19.9% 56.5%  23.6%
10  Research outside universities  71.7% 26.0%  2.4%
11 Culture    4.6% 43.4%  52.1%
12  Health and environmental protection  7.0% 40.2%  52.8%
13  Housing & community amenities  6.8% 21.6%  71.6%
14  Agriculture, forestry & fishing  22.3% 74.0%  3.7%
15  Fuel & energy & water  45.1% 42.9%  11.9%
16  Transportation & communication  43.6% 25.9%  30.5%
17  Other economic affairs and public property 
administration 
66.8% 11.4% 21.7%
18  Pensions for retired public servants  19.5% 67.3%  13.2%
19 Interest  payments  59.1% 32.8%  8.1%
20  Administration of social welfare   3.7% 29.3%  67.0%
21  Transfers to the pension system  100.0% 0.0%  0.0%
22  Other transfers to the social security system  95.5% 4.5%  0.0%
23 Social  assistance  1.7% 29.9%  68.4%
24 Youth  welfare  1.6% 27.0%  71.4%
25  Support for families and mothers  55.9% 32.5%  11.6%
26  Other social welfare   70.0% 23.9%  6.2%
27  Labour market policy and support for the unemployed  88.2% 11.8%  0.0%
28   unconditional transfers to other levels of government 
(transfers received minus transfers paid) 
275.9% 148.0% -323.9%
29 Other  expenditures  13.2% 69.8%  16.9%
 -  Total  46.8% 36.5%  16.7%
Source: Calculated from data provided by the Federal Statistical Office of Germany. 
 
An item that deserves some special comment is the function "unconditional transfers to other 
levels of government" in table 2 as well as table 3 below. Recall that we use net 
expenditures, defined as total expenditures less transfers received from other government 
levels. Conditional transfers earmarked to a specific function (such as transfers from state 
governments to local governments to support local school financing) are taken into account in   10
the specific function (spending on schools at the local government level are defined net of 
transfers received from state government for school financing and state government spending 
on schools includes these transfers). Unconditional transfers that are not earmarked to a 
specific purpose are covered in the function "unconditional transfers to other levels of 
government". The federal government provides considerable transfers to state government, 
especially to the East German states, and state governments pay a significant amount of 
money as unconditional transfers to local governments. Because the local government sector 
makes only small transfer payments to the state government sector, net expenditures in this 
function at the local level are negative.  
 
It should be noted that spending on health out of public budgets is of only minor importance 
at the federal, state and local public sector in Germany.
6 Public health expenditures are 
financed out of social security contributes. However, at the state and local government sector 
health related expenditures arise because the public sector provides investment grants for 
hospital buildings and homes for the elderly and the handicapped. In addition, there are 
means-tested social assistance benefits for handicapped and elderly persons.  
 
Table 3 reports the distribution of net expenditures by function across the three layers of 
government in 2002. We will only comment on the most notable facts. In public order and 
safety, the bulk of expenditures falls on the states. In the education system, spending by the 
federal government is of only minor importance whereas the states account for about 70% of 
education expenditures. 2/3 of welfare spending are borne by the federal government which 
provides massive transfers to support the unemployed as well as the public pension system. 
Thus, from table 3 we can conclude that subnational governments are in charge of public 
services targeted to the younger generation (education) whereas expenditures of the federal 
government are biased towards the elderly. Consequently, one should expect that the 
demographic changes will increase the fiscal burden of the federal government whereas the 
subnational government sector might profit from the declining share of the younger 
generation. However, as will be shown below, pension payments to retired public servants at 
the state level will increase dramatically in the near future and will counterbalance these 
expenditure savings.  
 
 
4. Methodical issues and data handling 
 
Before we turn to our empirical investigation we examine some methodical issues that arise 
when the effects of demographic change on public budgets are examined. Disregarding 
different government levels, we can write total public expenditures as: 
 









Ej,t denotes expenditures in spending category j in period t. A decomposition of expenditures 
by age groups can be achieved by using the age cost profile concept and rewriting public 
expenditures as: 
 
                                                 
6 In 2001 total health expenditures in Germany amounted to about 227 bn Euro (about 11% of GDP). The bulk of 
these expenditures were covered out of social security contributions whereas only about 8.1% of total health 
expenditures were financed out of the budgets of federal, state and local governments.   11
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N(x,t) denotes the population of the age x (x is the maximum age) in period t and Nt = 
ΣxN(x,t) total population. The variable e(x,j,t) is the age cost profile which provides 
information on per capita spending on citizens aged x for the public good j (such as education, 




) , , (
) , , (
t x N
t j x E
t j x e = . 
 
If the public good j is not age-specific (such as defence) the entries in e(x,j,t) are identical 
across all age groups.
7  
 
The empirical determination of age cost profiles is not an easy exercise and in some cases it is 
not clear to which age groups public good provision has to be assigned to. Thus, for example 
the "demand" for kindergarten services does not only depend on the number and age structure 
of the kids but also on social norms in societies, the female labour market participation rate 
etc. This means that the cost of providing kindergarten services can increase despite a drop in 
birth rates if for example female labour market participation rates increase.
8 As a matter of 
course, age cost profiles differ considerably across various spending categories. Spending on 
education for example is primarily targeted towards the young whereas health expenditures 
are higher for the elderly than for the young. In some categories a clear differentiation 
according to age groups might be very difficult or even impossible, as for instance in general 
public service provision or in public order and safety. Age cost profiles are hard to compare 
across different countries because public and private service provision differ considerably. In 
Germany, private universities as well as private schools are still of minor importance whereas 
in other countries, such as the US, private institutions in the education system are of far 
greater importance. Even stronger distinctions can be observed with respect to the financing 
of health care and the pension systems across countries. In federal systems, additional 
problems arise out of the fact that different layers of government perform different tasks and 
therefore age cost profiles aggregated across all government functions can be quite distinct 
between the different layers of government.  
 
If we had information about the age cost profiles of the various public sector spending 
categories as well as population forecasts - differentiated by age - we would be able to 
forecast the impact of demographic change on public expenditures. This is a simple exercise if 
we assume that age cost profiles are time-invariant, that is e(x,j,t) = e(x,j,t+τ) = e(x,j), for τ > 
0, in which case total spending in period t+τ is estimated by 
 







t j x e t x N E
11
) , ( ) , ( τ τ . 
 
                                                 
7 A corresponding age revenue profile can be constructed for taxes, user fees, social security contributions etc. 
However, as mentioned above, revenues are completely disregarded in the present study and therefore we 
completely disregard the impact of demographics on public sector revenues. 
8 In fact, the demand for kindergarten services should be considered a "derived" demand.   12
However, one should not expect that age cost profiles are time-invariant, see for example 
Franco and Munzi (1997) or Lee and Edwards (2001). A very simple procedure to make age 
cost profiles time-dependent is to specify a mechanical adjustment process: 
 
(5)   e(x,j,t+τ) = e(x,j,t)q(t+τ)π(j,t+τ). 
 
e(x,j,t) is the age cost profile in the basic period t, q(t+τ) denotes the productivity growth 
factor in the period from t to t+τ and π(j,t+τ) the price increase in function j relative to the 
GDP deflator. Thus for example, Lee and Edwards (2001) assume an annual productivity 
growth rate of 2.5%, e.g. q(t+1) = 1.025, and assume that per capita expenditures keep pace 
with productivity growth. In addition, they assume the cost of service provision in the health 
sector exceeds the GDP-deflator by 1% each year, e.g. π(health,t+1) = 1.01. Apart from these 
productivity and inflation effects there are numerous other mechanisms that can bring about 
changes in age cost profiles across time, and we briefly examine the four most important 
ones: relative price effects, changes in political preferences, cohort-size effects and changes in 
participation rates.  
 
Price effects can arise when, as the number of beneficiaries changes, the average cost of 
public service provision per worker changes, taking a specific benefit-level as given, see Lee 
and Edward (2001). Because the aging of the society increases the share of old-aged people, 
the cost of service provision to the elderly per worker increases if per capita spending on the 
elderly is left unchanged. This increase in the price of the care for the elderly per worker can 
result in a reduction of per capita services provided to the elderly. Gruber and Wise (2001) 
report evidence that an increase of the share of the elderly by 1% increases spending on the 
elderly - measured as a share of GDP - by 0.5 percent. Cohort-size effects are rather similar to 
these price effects. Poterba (1997) for the U.S. and Seitz and Baum (2003) for (West) 
Germany find that total spending on public schools does not change significantly if the 
number of school aged children changes. This suggests that the age cost profile for school 
education depends on cohort size and can be written as e(t,N(6-20,t)), with N(6-20,t) denoting 
the number of school-aged people in period t. This age cost profile has the property 
δe(..)/δN(6-20) < 0 and the elasticity of e with respect to N, ηe,N, is approximately -1. This 
means, that total education expenditures are left virtually unchanged if the size of the school-
age cohort changes. However, whereas price effects are derived from neoclassical reasoning, 
the cohort size effects are due to the fact that (political) decisions on public school spending 
are arrived at by deciding on total school spending and not upon per capita benefit 
considerations. One should expect that rather strong changes in cohort sizes, see for example 
the evidence presented by Kempkes (2005) on public school spending in East Germany
9, 
should result in significant adjustments of total school expenditures and consequently in the 
long-run ηe,N  → 0 should hold, i.e. in the long run cohort size effects should be rather small. 
Contrary to that, one should expect that price effects are rather small in the short-run - benefit 
provision to the elderly cannot be cut immediately - and increase in size in the long-run. In 
our empirical investigation we disregard cohort-size effects because we examine a period of 
almost 30 years in which a complete adjustment of expenditures to changes in demographics 
is achieved.
10 The ageing of the society also changes the distribution of voting power at the 
ballot box and works in favour of political parties and policy makers that have more 
favourable preferences for goods provided to the elderly, see Edwards and Lee (2001). 
Consequently, one should expect that per capita benefits for the elderly increase whereas 
                                                 
9 In East Germany, in recent years the number of pupils in elementary schools dropped by about 50%! 
10 However, cohort effects might well force the government to incur debts during the adjustment periods. This in 
turn might affect public budget in the long run via interest and debt service payments.   13
younger generations will live to see cuts in public good provision.
11 An empirical 
investigation of this effect is quite demanding and cannot be achieved in this study. Therefore, 
these effects are also disregarded. 
 
Another important source of changes in age cost profiles is the participation effect. As set out 
above, the usual procedure to estimate age cost profiles is to divide spending on a specific age 
group by the number of persons in this age group as stated in equation (3). Alternatively one 
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The index j has been suppressed for the sake of convenience. P(x,t) ≤ N(x,t) is the number of 
persons that actually consume the public good and c(.) is the average cost of providing the 
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which gives the share of people at the age of x that consume the public good. Given that  
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The assumption of a constant e(.) implies that c(.) is unchanged and that P changes 
proportionally to N and thus, the participation rate is constant. However, if participation rates 
change over time and c(.) is constant, e(.) changes even if N is kept constant. Consequently, if 
there are strong a priory reasons to expect changes in participation rates, forecasts of future 
expenditures have to be made by applying the formula: 
 
(9)   E(x,t+τ) = e(x,t)·N(x,t+τ)·q(x,t+τ)/q(x,t). 
 
Note that the participation effect can be at work independently of the price effect, cohort size 
effect as well as the political power effect. 
 
The most prominent example for secular trends in participation rates is student enrolment in 
universities. As figure 5 shows, participation rates (enrolment rates) - especially those of 
women - in the university system in Germany increased rather strongly. Whereas only about 
12% of people aged 20-28 attended a university in the mid 70ties, this ratio increased to about 
26% in 2003 and differences between male and female enrolment rates are now quite small 
(~2.7%) as compared to about 8% in 1975. One might well expect that enrolment rates will 
                                                 
11 See, however, Gradstein and Kaganovich (2004) who argue the other way round.    14
further increase in the future, perhaps with a slower growth rate after achieving a convergence 
of male and female enrolment rates. Using a simple forecasting technique
12 we estimated that 
the total enrolment rate will increase to about 35% in 2030, which means that the participation 
factor, q(x,t+τ)/q(x,t), in the university system is about 1.35 in 2030.
13  
 
Figure 5: Number of university students per 100 inhabitants aged 20-28 in Germany 1975 - 
2003 and forecast 2004 - 2030 
Source: Federal Statistical Office of Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt). Data up to 1990 refer to West Germany 
only, data 1993 - 2030 refer to Germany. 
 
In our empirical examination we will disregard all effects discussed above with the exception 
of the participation effect. The inflation effect is usually taken into account in health service 
provision. However, public health expenditures are of only minor importance in Germany and 
we therefore neglect this effect in our empirical work. Productivity effects do not matter if 
these effects affect all government functions alike and we have no a priori assumptions to 
justify any differentiated effects across the various government functions.
14 This means that in 
our subsequent empirical investigation we completely abstract from real and nominal growth. 
Thus, we conduct a comparative static experiment isolating the effects of demographic change 
by fictitiously transferring the demographic structure of 2030 to the year 2002. With respect 
to interest payments, the neglect of productivity effects implies that the debt-GDP ratio as 
well as real interest rates in 2030 are identical to the 2003 figures. Participation effects are 
introduced in university education as well as in the provision of pensions to retired public 
servants. With respect to pension payments for retired public servants we have to take into 
account that the number of retired public servants relative to the number of old-aged persons 
(65+) changes in the period up to 2030. In 2003 there were a total of about 895.000 
pensioners (including surviving dependants) and the majority, about 65%, are financed by 
state governments. 24% accrue to the federal government and 11% to the local government 
                                                 
12 We assume that the growth of enrolment rates of male and female students take on the average value in the 
period 1995-2003 in which case "convergence" of male and female enrolment rates is achieved in 2009. In the 
period 2010 - 2030 we assume an annual increase in the enrolment rate of both sexes of 0.4% which corresponds 
to the average annual growth rate of the male enrolment rate in the period 1995 - 2003.   
13 As a matter of course, this factor is also applied to the function "financial support for students". 














sector. Recently, the Federal Ministry of the Interior (2005) published a report on public 
sector pension obligations up to the year 2050 differentiated by the federal, state and local 
government sector. From this report we can derive an estimate of the number of public 
pensioners
15 relative to the total number of the elderly (65+). This ratio is used as an estimate 
of the participation factor in forecasting public pension payments. At the federal government 




To summarize, spending - net of inflation and productivity growth - at government level f  is 
estimated by applying the formula 
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with t denoting the base year (2002) and t+τ the year 2030. The parameter λ(j,f) serves to 
incorporate adjustments in age cost profiles due to changing participation rates (student 
enrolment at universities) as well as changes in the ratio of public sector pensioners relative to 
the number of the elderly. In addition, the parameter λ can be used to take into account policy 
changes on the provision of public services that have already been decided on. Thus, for 
example, recently several pension reforms were introduced in Germany that will lead to cuts 
in pension payments in the future. This in turn will reduce the growth of federal transfers to 
the social security system. According to the results of Werding and Kaltschütz (2005), if the 
pension system that will be valid in 2030 had been already introduced in 2002, pensions in 
2002 would have been about 15% lower. Therefore, we set λ to 0.85 at the federal 
government level in function 21 (subsidies to the old age pension system) when we calculate 
federal expenditures in 2030. Finally, we make an adjustment in the function "research 
outside universities" by setting λ equal to 1.35, which is identical to the participation effect 
estimated in the university system. We justify this assumption for the reason that investment 
into research outside universities should at least keep pace with human capital accumulation, 
measured as the ratio of students at universities relative to the population 20 - 28. In all other 
government functions the parameter λ takes on the value 1.0.  
 
Finally, another adjustment has to be made because a significant amount of unconditional 
transfers of the federal government are directed to the East German states and these transfers  
terminate in 2020.
17 Therefore, we adjust net expenditures of the three levels of government 
in 2030 as compared to 2002 in function 28 ("unconditional transfers to other levels of 
government") to take these effects into account. Because the East German states use these 
transfers to finance investment expenditures to reconstruct the infrastructure in East Germany 
and to pay capital subsidies to private companies that invest in East Germany, the East 
                                                 
15 In fact, we do not use the number of public sector pensioners but expenditures on pensions in the public sector 
derived on the assumption, that there will be no nominal adjustment of pensions in the period up to 2050. 
Therefore we take into account the changing structure of public sector pensions. 
16 Taking the state government level as an example, these factors are calculated as follows: The population 65+ 
increases by about 50% in 2002-2030 and the number of public sector pensioners at the state level by about 69%. 
From this we calculate 1.69/1.5 ~ 1.12. These means, that the number of state public sector pensioners increases 
about 12% faster than the total number of elderly, 65+, in the period 2002 - 2030. At the federal and local 
government level public sector pensioners increase by a slower rate as the total number of the elderly and 
therefore the participation factors are smaller than 1.0. 
17 For a detailed discussion of federal transfers to the East German States see Seitz (2004). Apart from federal 
transfers to the East German states we also take into account the termination of federal bailout transfers to 
Bremen and Saarland in the year 2004.   16
German states will be forced to reduce (investment) expenditures by at least the same amount 
in order to avoid excessive deficits. It is difficult to estimate which government functions are 
affected by these expenditure cuts. Therefore, we adjusted the function 29 "other 
expenditures" by these amounts downward.
18 
 
If we have an estimate of public expenditures by level of government in the year 2030 we can 
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VFI(f,t+τ) is an indicator of vertical fiscal imbalance at government level f and corresponds to 
the difference of the 2002 and 2030 expenditure share of the government level f. If VFI is 
positive for government level f the expenditure share increases relative to that of the other 
levels of government.  
 
 
5. Empirical results 
 
Our estimates of the effects of demographic change on public expenditures at the various 
levels of government in Germany are subject to the following assumptions: 
1.  The population is divided into six age groups.  
2.  Age cost profiles are assumed not to change in the period 2002 to 2030. However, we 
take into account participation effects in university education, the changing intensity 
of public sector pensions as well as latest pension reforms and an upward adjustment 
of public research expenditures. 
3.  The public expenditure structure is perfectly adjusted to changes in the age 
composition as well as the size of the population in the period 2002 - 2030.  
4.  Price effects (wage and price inflation) as well as real growth are disregarded because 
these do not affect the estimate of vertical fiscal expenditure imbalances as long as 
these effects are identical across government functions and levels of government. 
5.  "Estimates" of age cost profiles are derived from data for the fiscal year 2002 as 
explained below. 
6.  We assume that the distribution of tasks between the different levels of governments 
as well as the legal and institutional settings do not change in the period 2002 to 2030. 
 
All relevant assumptions about the "demand" for public services by the various age groups are 
reported in table 4. The entries in the table constitute a matrix of age-cost profile indicators 
which can be written as I(j,x). The index j = 1, ..J (J = 29) denotes the government function 




                                                 
18 In 2002 net expenditures in function 28 have been: federal government 24,789 bn Euro, state government 
sector: 13,292 bn Euro and local government sector -29,097 bn Euro. The figures for 2030 are: federal 
government: 13,259 bn Euro, state government sector: 22,522 bn Euro and local government sector -26,797 bn 
Euro. The corresponding figures for function 29 are in 2002: federal government 558 bn Euro, state government 
sector: 2.951 bn Euro and local government sector 716 bn Euro. The figures for 2030 are: federal government 
558 bn Euro, state government sector -6.279 bn Euro and local government sector -1.584 bn Euro.   17
Table 4: Assumptions on age cost profile indicators by government function 
 
 Age  group 







1  General public services and administration  111 1  1  1
2 Defence  111 1  1  1
3  Public order & safety  0 1 1 1 0.5 0.5
4 Jurisdiction  &  prison  001 1  0  0
5 Schools  010 0  0  0
6 Kindergarten  100 0  0  0
7 Universities  001 0  0  0
8  Financial support to students  011 0  0  0
9  All other education   011 0  0  0
10  Research outside universities  001 1  0  0
11 Culture    0.2 1 1 1 1  0.2
12  Health and environmental protection  0 1 1 1 0.5 0.5
13  Housing & community amenities  0.2 0.2 1 1 0.2 0.2
14  Agriculture, forestry & fishing  001 1  0  0
15  Fuel & energy & water  0.2 1 1 1 0.2 0.2
16  Transportation & communication  0.5 1 1 1 0.5 0.2
17  Other economic affairs and public property 
administration  111 1  1  1
18  Pensions for retired public servants  000 0  1  1
19 Interest  payments  111 1  1  1
20  Administration of social welfare   111 1  1  1
21  Transfers to the pension system  000 0  1  1
22  Other transfers to the social security system  0 0 1 1 0.5 0.2
23 Social  assistance  111 1  1  1
24 Youth  welfare  0.2 1 0.5 0 0 0
25  Support for families and mothers  110 0  0  0
26  Other social welfare   111 1  1  1
27  Labour market policy and support for the 
unemployed  001 1  0  0
28   unconditional transfers to other levels of 
government (transfers received minus transfers 
payed) 1 1 1 1  1  1
29 Other  expenditures  111 1  1  1
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Per capita expenditure on a representative member of age group x in function j at the 
government level f is calculated as: 
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f denotes expenditure of the government level f (f = federal, state, local) in government 
function j in fiscal year 2002. A "0" entry in table 4 means that the specific age group does 
not consume the public good provided within the specific government function. The entries in 
table 4 have been derived by examining the public services provided in the various age 
groups and are based on "subjective" judgements as well as empirical facts
19. Note that the 
matrix I(j,x) is identical across government levels but age cost profiles differ because the 
government sectors spend different amounts of money in the various categories. Figure 6 
presents estimates of per capita spending on each age group aggregated across all government 
functions by level of government in 2002 in Germany.
20 The highest per capita expenditures 
arise at the federal level for the elderly due to the massive transfer payments of the federal 
government to the public pension system. State and local government spending on the other 
side is biased towards the younger generation. The main reason for this is the fact that 
responsibility for the education system - including kindergarten - rests upon state and local 
governments. 
 
Figure 6: Net spending per capita of the relevant age group across all government 
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Source: Own calculations based on assumptions as set out in table 4 and data on net expenditures provided by 
the Federal Statistical Office. 
 
                                                 
19 For instance, we collected data on the age structure of students, social assistance recipients, people imprisoned, 
etc. See Seitz (2004) for detailed evidence. In our future work we will discuss the rationale of the entries in table 
4 in more detail.  
20 By assumption, these are identical to the age cost profiles in 2030 with the exceptions mentioned above.   19
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ε(x,f) denotes the share of expenditures at government level f
21 devoted to age group x.
22 It is 
important to note the differences between age cost profiles and age expenditure shares. 
Whereas age cost profiles provide information about per capita spending per person at some 
specific age, the age expenditure shares provide information about the share of public 
expenditures spent on a specific age group.
23 Using the age cost profiles derived above and 
most recent population forecasts we calculate age expenditure shares. The results are 
presented in figure 7a (federal), 7b (state) and 7c (local). We can see that the share of 
expenditures devoted to the younger generation drops significantly for all levels of 
government whereas spending shares on the elderly increase. Taking into account our 
discussion above as well as the trend towards the ageing of the society this result is, as a 
matter of course, no surprise. However, the crucial questions are, whether these changes result 
in an increase in total expenditures and whether this process is accompanied by vertical fiscal 
expenditure imbalances. 
 
Figure 7a: Age specific expenditure shares across all government functions at the federal 
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Source: Own calculations based on assumptions as set out in table 4 and data on net expenditures provided by 
the Federal Statistical Office. 
 
                                                 
21 By construction, expenditure shares within each spending categories are identical across the three layers of 
government. 
22 In equation (3) and (4) we suppressed the time index t for the sake of convenience. 
23 Recall that in our definition the social security system is not part of the government sector and therefore social 
security spending is not included in the list of functions covered in table 4.   20
Figure 7b: Age specific expenditure shares across all government functions at the state 
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Source: Own calculations based on assumptions as set out in table 4 and data on net expenditures provided by 
the Federal Statistical Office. 
 
Figure 7c: Age specific expenditure shares across all government functions at the local 
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Source: Own calculations based on assumptions as set out in table 4 and data on net expenditures provided by 
the Federal Statistical Office. 
 
In table 5 we report the calculated expenditure changes for the 29 government functions, both 
in % as well as in absolute numbers. In many cases we estimate cost savings effects at all 
levels of government. Despite the fact, that we introduced a participation effect of 1.35 for 
spending on universities as well as for research outside universities, total expenditures on 
education and research will decline by about 7% at the state and by about 16% at the local 
level. This reflects the sharp drop in the school-relevant age-cohort which decreases by about 
20% in the period 2002 - 2030.   
 
   21
Table 5: Estimation results by spending category 
 
%-change of net expenditures 
2002 - 2030 
Change of net expenditures 
2002 - 2030 in mill. Euro 
 
Federal  State Local  Federal  State Local 
General public services and 
administration 
-1.6% -1.6% -1.8% -192 -204 -274
Defence  -1.6%  -   -  -387  -  -
Public order & safety  -5.8% -5.8% -6.1% -137  -743  -380
Jurisdiction & prison  -10.5% -10.5%  -  -33  -1,090  -





Financial support to students 
All other education  

















































Culture   -3.6% -3.6% -3.9% -14  -133  -171
Health and environmental protection  -5.8% -5.8% -6.1% -57  -330  -454
Housing & community amenities  -7.9% -7.9% -8.1% -131  -418  -1,415
Agriculture, forestry & fishing  -10.5% -10.5% -10.7% -123  -409  -21
Fuel & energy & water  -9.6% -9.6% -9.9% -641  -609  -175
Transportation & communication  -7.4% -7.4% -7.6% -738  -438  -534
Other economic affairs and public 
property administration 
-1.6% -1.6% -1.8% -378 -65  -142
Pensions for retired public servants  -4.0% 68.1% 31.8% -241 14,318  1,311
Interest payments  -1.6% -1.6% -1.8% -585  -324  -92
Administration of social welfare   -1.6% -1.6% -1.8% -3  -21  -56
Transfers to the pension system  27.6%  -   -  20,574  -  -
Other transfers to the social security 
system 
-4.4% -4.4%  -  -416  -20  -
Social assistance  -1.6% -1.6% -1.8% -8  -135  -356
Youth welfare  -18.0% -18.0% -18.3% -26 -443  -1,191
Support for families and mothers  -18.6% -18.6% -19.1% -1,101 -641 -234
Other social welfare   -1.6% -1.6% -1.8% -88  -30  -9
Labour market policy and support for 
the unemployed 
-10.5% -10.5%  -  -1,802  -242  -
interjurisdictional unconditional 
transfers 
-46.5% 69.4% -7.9% -11,530 9,230 2.300
other expenditures  0.0% -313% -321% 0  -9,248  -2,300
total  1.4% 1.5% -7.4% 3,752 3,197  -7,267
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At the federal level, education expenditures increase by about 17% because the federal 
government does not profit from a reduced school population as school expenditures at the 
federal level are very small. The most important item that pushes expenditures upward at the 
federal level are subsidies to the social security system which will increase by almost 30% - 
net of productivity and inflation effects. However, almost 60% of this expenditure increase is 
counterbalanced by the drop in unconditional transfer to the East German states. At the state 
level, the expenditure push is due to the strong increase in public pension payments, which 
increase by about 68%. However, a significant share of these additional expenditures is 
balanced by cost savings in other functions (e.g. schools). Local governments achieve 
significant savings in the education sector, because the population in the age groups 0-6 and 
6-20 drops by about 20%. Savings are also calculated for youth welfare and housing whereas 
pension payments for retired public servants will increase by about 32%. 
 
Table 6: Changes in expenditures by level of government induced by demographic change in 









Federal government  1.35% 2,98%  0,66%
State Government Sector  1.48% 3,11%  0,56%
Local Government Sector  -7.41% -5,70%  -1,22%
Total Government Sector (federal, state and 
local governments)  -0.05% 1,55% 
 
- 
Subnational government sector (state and 
local governments)  -1.29% 0,29%  -0,66%
Memo item: population growth 2002-2030  -1.6% 
 
Source: Own calculations based on assumptions as set out in table 4 and data on net expenditures provided by 
the Federal Statistical Office. 
 
In table 6 we report our estimated expenditure changes by level of government in the period 
2002-2030. The level of total government expenditure is likely to stay virtually constant. 
Federal expenditures increase slightly by about 1.4% and state expenditures by approximately 
1.5% whereas local government expenditures will drop by about 7.4%. Due to the shrinking 
population in the period 2002 to 2030, per capita spending of the federal government will 
grow by about 3%, and approximately 3.1% at the state level. Per capita local government 
spending will decrease by roughly 5.7%. However, if we compare the federal government and 
the subnational government sector - state and local government - we find a significant 
expenditure growth gap of almost 3%. The total subnational government sector will achieve 
expenditures savings of about 1.3%. Thus, a redistribution of revenues between the federal 
government and the subnational government sector is necessary as well as a redistribution of 
revenues within the subnational government sector. In addition, table 5 reports the vertical 
fiscal imbalance indicator, VFI, which shows that the spending share of the federal 
government increases by almost 0.7% which can also be used as an estimator of necessary 
revenue adjustment.  
 
Thus, our simulation results suggest that demographic change will not change total 
government expenditures that much. Increases in pension payments to retired public servants 
as well as in federal subsidies to the social security system will be counterbalanced by 
demographic savings in other functions as well as the reduction of federal transfers to the East 
German states. However, per capita expenditures increase slightly which means that either   23
expenditures (more precisely: benefit levels) have to be cut or taxes have to be increased in 
order to avoid deficits. In addition, the expenditure structure by government function has to be 
adjusted to the changing age structure of the population. This means that demographic savings 
that arise in many functions have to be mobilized in order to finance expenditure increases in 
other functions, such as pension payments to retired public servants or contributions of the 
federal government to the social security system. Because our results suggest fiscal 
imbalances between the federal government sector and the subnational government sector as 
well as within the subnational government sector, a redistribution of tax revenues across the 
different layers of government is necessary.  
 
Finally, we take a short look at the impact of demographics on the fiscal stance of the various 
levels of government. As we argued above, the predominance of joint taxes as well as 
intensive intergovernmental transfers will virtually smooth away demographically induced 
differences of revenue capacity across federal, state and local governments. The results 
presented by Bach et al. (2002)
24 suggest that in the period 2002 - 2030 the impact of the 
changing age structure on tax revenues will be quite small and the population elasticity of tax 
revenues is about 1.0, which means, that a 1% decline of the population will lead to a 1% loss 
of tax revenues. Consequently, we can derive an estimate of the impact of demographic 
change on deficits using the results in table 5. The total government sector will run a deficit 
of about 1.6% of total expenditures. The subnational government sector is almost balanced. 
However, there are marked differences between state and local governments. The federal 
government runs a deficit of about 3%. Thus, not only the vertical expenditure imbalances but 
also the estimated demographic impact on deficits indicates the need of redistributing 
revenues and/or tasks in the German federal system.  
 
 
6. Conclusions and prospects for further research 
  
The paper discussed the fiscal consequences of demographic change in a federal system 
taking Germany as an example. Using a very simple technique, we derived estimates of the 
likely impact of the ageing of the society on federal, state and local government expenditures. 
The revenue side has been completely disregarded because of the peculiarities of the German 
system of revenue distribution across the various levels of government. Our results suggest 
that the federal government will have to bear a higher fiscal burden from demographic change 
as compared to subnational governments. At all levels of governments significant expenditure 
savings arise especially in those spending categories that are targeted towards the younger 
generation, as for example education. This applies despite the fact that we took into account a 
considerable increase in university enrolment rates. Demographically induced increases in 
spending are due to pension payments either because the number of retired public servants 
increases or the increase in federal transfers to the social security system. Our results suggest 
that in the near future significant, albeit not dramatic, vertical imbalances will occur in 
Germany between the federal and subnational government level. This calls for an adjustment 
of revenue distribution in the federal system. It is interesting to note, that a recent study for 
Canada, see Conference Board of Canada (2002), arrived at quite different conclusions. This 
study predicts that ageing in Canada will put pressure on provinces and will contribute to an 
improvement of the fiscal stance of the federal government. The main reason for the 
differences between Canada and Germany seems to be that the Canadian Provinces are 
responsible for providing tax financed health care. Thus, the federal distribution of the fiscal 
                                                 
24 The calculations of Bach et al. (2002) rest upon tax legislation in 2005.   24
burden of demographic change can be quite different across federal countries due to varying 
institutional frameworks.  
 
Much work has still to be done in future research. In our study, we introduced changes in the 
age cost profiles only in some government functions but one should expect that more if not all 
government functions will live to see significant changes in the age cost profile. In addition, 
an estimate of age cost profiles supported by refined data is necessary in order to substitute 
our very simple (ad hoc) estimate. Another important step is to extend our work towards a 
general study of sustainability by incorporating the revenue side and an analysis of public 
debt. As a matter of course, our "age cost profile approach" used in this paper is not the only 
research strategy to examine the impact of demographic change on budgetary variables. Thus, 
it would be interesting to compare results obtained from using different estimation strategies, 
including those obtained from econometric methods, as for example presented by 
Hondroyiannis and Papapetrou (2000). 
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